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Smoking Out Racism in the FDNY 
THE DWINDLING USE OF RACE-CONSCIOUS 
HIRING REMEDIES  
INTRODUCTION 
The New York City Fire Department (the Fire 
Department or FDNY), despite its proud history, remains an 
organization unwelcoming to minorities. In 2007, the United 
States—later joined by the Vulcan Society and individual 
plaintiffs—brought suit against the Fire Department alleging 
that it discriminated against blacks and Hispanics in violation 
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 The U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of New York found that the Fire 
Department’s entry-level hiring examinations had both a 
disparate impact and was the product of systematic disparate 
treatment.2 However, the initial remedy—an interim race-
conscious hiring plan—did not require the hiring of a sufficient 
number of black and Hispanic applicants to address the severe 
underrepresentation of minority firefighters.3 Nevertheless, the 
City of New York (the City) refused to implement any of these 
plans.4 As a result, the court imposed an extensive oversight 
plan that prematurely restrained the City from developing its 
own solution.5 
Before resorting to extensive oversight, the court should 
have adopted a race-conscious hiring plan that requires the 
City to hire a sufficient number of black and Hispanic 
  
 1 See Complaint ¶ 1, United States v. City of New York, No. 07-CV-2067 
(E.D.N.Y. May 21, 2007), ECF No. 1. The Vulcan Society also brought a similar state 
claim under New York Human Rights laws. Intervenors’ Complaint ¶ 1, City of New 
York, No. 07-CV-2067 (E.D.N.Y. July 17, 2007), 2007 WL 3117053, ECF No. 48. 
 2 See infra Parts IV.B-C; United States v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 2d 
77, 132 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (disparate impact order); United States v. City of New York, 
683 F. Supp. 2d 225, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (disparate treatment order). 
 3 See infra Part V.A; City of New York, No. 07-CV-2067, 2010 WL 3709350, 
at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2010). 
 4 Letter from Michael A. Cardozo, N.Y.C. Corp. Counsel, to Nicholas G. 
Garaufis, Judge, E.D.N.Y., City of New York, No. 07-CV-2067 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2010), 
ECF No. 532. 
 5 See infra Part V.B; City of New York, 07-CV-2067, 2011 WL 6131136, at 
*15 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2011). 
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applicants. If such a plan were enforced, the Fire Department 
would have had incentive to reform its hiring and recruiting 
methods without having to continuously seek court approval. 
The court likely avoided this option because it was sensitive to 
an increasing sentiment that affirmative action is no longer an 
appropriate method of relief.6 Unless and until this social and 
political movement results in an amendment to Title VII, 
however, future courts should embrace the benefits of race-
conscious hiring remedies.  
Part I of this note provides a background of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, discussing the theories of 
disparate treatment and disparate impact, as well as the broad 
range of remedies available. Part II provides a summary of the 
current affirmative-action debate, and concludes that court-
ordered, race-conscious relief is still a legitimate and important 
remedy in Title VII claims. Part III discusses the history of 
racial discrimination in the FDNY. Part IV discusses the 
procedural history and current posture of United States v. City 
of New York. Part V critiques the court in United States v. City 
of New York for its extensive oversight plan, and suggests that 
if it enforced an adequate ratio of race-conscious hiring at the 
outset, it would have provided sufficient incentive for the Fire 
Department to more permanently remedy the discrimination 
on its own terms. Finally, this note concludes that future courts 
should continue to embrace race-conscious injunctive relief, 
especially where deep-seated racial discrimination is found. 
I. TYPES OF CLAIMS AND RELIEF UNDER TITLE VII OF THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court 
has broad authority to grant relief. The court in United States v. 
City of New York should have used this broad authority to 
impose race-conscious interim hiring. Title VII makes it illegal 
“for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.”7 Title VII is “a law triggered by a 
Nation’s concern over centuries of racial injustice and intended 
to improve the lot of those who had been excluded from the 
  
 6 See infra Part II. 
 7 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
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American dream for so long.”8 There are essentially two theories 
under which a plaintiff can prove an unlawful employment 
practice: disparate treatment and disparate impact. 
A. Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact Claims 
In race-based disparate treatment claims, the principal 
issue is whether the employer “treats some people less 
favorably than others because of their race, [or] color.”9 These 
cases typically involve discrete instances of intentional 
discriminatory conduct, rather than general practices.10 
Liability is found where the employer’s decisions are “actually 
motivated” by the employee’s protected trait.11 In other words, 
the protected trait must have “had a determinative influence” 
on the employer’s decision.12  
Disparate treatment claims are further subdivided into 
single-motive,13 mixed-motive,14 and systematic disparate 
treatment (or “pattern or practice”)15 theories. Single-motive 
and mixed-motive claims are the more traditional and more 
easily supported claims because they tend to focus on discrete 
events. Systematic disparate treatment, on the other hand, is 
in many ways more difficult to prove. Nevertheless, the court 
found systematic disparate treatment in United States v. City 
of New York.16 
A systematic disparate treatment (“pattern or practice”) 
case must establish that the employer has put in place an 
overall system that naturally (and purposely) leads to adverse 
employment actions that are based on employees’ protected 
class.17 Statistical evidence alone may establish such a case.18 
For example, in a test-taking situation, if the ratio of minority 
applicants who pass the exam is two or three standard 
  
 8 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979) (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 9 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).  
 10 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 11 Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) (noting that 
disparate treatment theory is also available under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act). 
 12 Id. 
 13 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801. 
 14 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 & n.12 (1989). 
 15 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 329, 342 (1977). 
 16 United States v. City of New York, 683 F. Supp. 2d 225, 241-42, 273 
(E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 17 See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 334-36. 
 18 See id. at 339-40 & n.20. 
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deviations below the ratio of minority applicants who took the 
exam, that may suffice.19 Typically, however, courts look for 
anecdotal evidence of discrimination to buttress the statistical 
showing.20 The employer could attack the statistical showing by 
questioning the accuracy of the data collected, or by arguing the 
particular labor pool that the plaintiff used was not appropriate.21 
The employer could also assert a nondiscriminatory reason for the 
disparity—for example, that the general population within the 
protected class simply does not prefer the occupation—but this 
defense is difficult to make credibly since the employer must 
support it with extensive evidence and cannot base its reasoning 
on stereotypical inferences.22 Once a pattern or practice is found, 
each plaintiff has the opportunity to present evidence of 
individual damages, for which the employer can offer a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason.23 
The court in United States v. City of New York also 
found that the City discriminated against black and Hispanic 
applicants under the theory of disparate impact.24 Disparate 
impact cases, unlike disparate treatment cases, do not require 
discriminatory motive.25 Instead, the plaintiff must show that a 
particular policy, while not discriminatory on its face, 
disproportionately affects a protected class.26 This theory was 
developed to combat employment procedures that are not 
predictive of future job performance and have “built-in 
headwinds” that work against minority groups.27 However, 
applicants claiming injury under the disparate impact theory 
must still have been qualified for the job; the theory does not 
  
 19 See Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., Inc., 26 F.3d 1277, 1291 n.26 (5th 
Cir. 1994); cf. Kadas v. MCI Systemhouse Corp., 255 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(noting that not all cases find two to three standard deviations to be sufficient and that 
there is no bright-line rule).  
 20 See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339 (noting that plaintiffs did 
not rely on “statistics alone,” but instead “brought the cold numbers convincingly to life”). 
 21 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308-13 (1977); 
Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., Co., 267 F.3d 147, 159 (2d Cir. 2001) 
 22 See infra note 249 and accompanying text. 
 23 See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 361-62. 
 24 See infra Part IV.B; United States v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 2d 77, 
132 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 25 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). Like systematic 
disparate treatment claims, two or three standard deviations from the expected ratio 
will normally suffice. See Stagi v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 391 F. App’x 133, 137-38 
(3d Cir. 2010). 
 26 See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
 27 See id. at 432 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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simply allow “the less qualified [to] be preferred over the better 
qualified simply because of minority origins.”28 
B. Forms of Relief and the Value of Race-Conscious 
Measures 
The wide-ranging forms of relief available under Title 
VII demonstrate that the court in United States v. City of New 
York both failed to utilize and subsequently abused this broad 
authority. The goal of relief in an employment discrimination 
action is always a combination of deterrence and 
compensation.29 Forms of relief include preliminary and 
permanent injunctions,30 back pay,31 and front pay.32 Disparate 
treatment claims, unlike disparate impact claims, also allow 
for compensatory damages33 and “any other equitable relief.”34 
1. The Development of Race-Conscious Injunctive 
Relief 
Injunctive relief has been interpreted broadly—a 
district court “has not merely the power but the duty” to “bar 
like discrimination in the future.”35 Therefore, courts will often 
issue remedies that allow the court to monitor—but not dictate 
the methods of—compliance. For example, it is regularly 
required that any future examination or “selection device” be 
reviewed by the court and approved before its use.36 Other 
court-ordered procedures typically require applicants to be 
  
 28 Id. at 436. 
 29 See Joseph A. Seiner, The Failure of Punitive Damages in Employment 
Discrimination Cases: A Call for Change, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 735, 740, 749 (2008) 
(discussing the history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, stating that its purpose was 
largely “‘to effectuate a greater level of deterrence’” and to “‘strengthen existing 
protections and remedies available under federal civil rights laws to 
provide . . . adequate compensation for victims of discrimination’” (quoting Vanessa 
Ruggles, Note, The Ineffectiveness of Capped Damages in Cases of Employment 
Discrimination: Solutions Toward Deterrence, 6 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 143, 154 (2006); 
H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt.2, at 1)). 
 30 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(2), (g), 12117(a) (2006). 
 31 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g), 2000e-16(d), 12117(a); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), (c). 
 32 See Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 889 (3d Cir. 1984) (“[A]n 
award for a reasonable future period required for the victim to reestablish her rightful 
place in the job market.”). 
 33 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, -16, 12117(a). 
 34 Id. § 2000e-5. 
 35 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975). 
 36 See United States v. City of New York, No. 07-CV-2067, 2010 WL 3709350, 
at *3-4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2010) (quoting Guardians Ass’n of the N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 
Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 630 F.2d 79, 109 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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hired at a certain ratio, usually reflecting “the applicant pool or 
the relevant work force,” which ensures that no disparate 
impact could later be found.37 Courts understand that 
combating future discrimination will almost invariably require 
a race-conscious effort in order to be effective.38  
The scope of injunctive relief in Title VII cases has 
expanded greatly over the last thirty-plus years. At first, while 
employers were not forced to engage in affirmative action 
measures, they were given permission to do so by courts without 
the threat of future litigation based on “reverse discrimination.” 
In 1979, the Court in United Steel Workers of America v. Weber 
explicitly allowed the employers to engage in “private, voluntary, 
race-conscious affirmative action plans.”39 To deny this form of 
relief, the Court opined, “would ‘bring about an end completely 
at variance with the purpose of the statute’ and must be 
rejected.”40 Since the original purpose of Title VII was to aid in 
the “‘the plight of the Negro in our economy,’”41 “[i]t would be 
ironic indeed” to use it against this purpose.42 
Specifically, the Court in Weber allowed the employer to 
set racial-equality goals by reserving half of the positions in its 
craft-worker training programs for blacks.43 The Court found 
that the plan did not “unnecessarily trammel the interests of 
the white employees” since it did not go so far as to require 
white employees to be discharged.44 The Court also found it 
important to emphasize that the plan was temporary; the plan 
ended the moment the percentage of blacks in the labor force 
was properly represented in the plant.45 
In 1987, United States v. Paradise laid the foundation 
for injunctive relief in the form of court-ordered affirmative-
action plans.46 The fundamental shortcoming of the court in 
United States v. City of New York was to discount the 
significance of Paradise in some instances and overextend its 
  
 37 Id. at *7 (quoting Guardians, 630 F.2d at 109). 
 38 See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. 
 39 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979). 
 40 Id. at 202 (quoting United States v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 345 U.S. 295, 315 
(1953)). 
 41 Id. (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)). 
 42 Id. at 204. But see Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (finding that 
employers engaged in “reverse discrimination” when the employer voluntarily 
invalidated an entrance exam under the belief that the exam had a disparate impact on 
minority applicants). 
 43 Weber, 443 U.S. at 198. 
 44 Id. at 208. 
 45 Id. at 208-09. 
 46 480 U.S. 149 (1987). 
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scope in others. Paradise affirms that “courts have the 
authority and the duty not only to order an end to 
discriminatory practices, but also to correct and eliminate the 
present effects of past discrimination.”47 Almost twelve years 
after the district court ordered its initial decision, the court 
forced the employer “to take affirmative and substantial steps 
to open the upper ranks to black troopers.”48 The court’s order 
required 50 percent or more of corporal promotions be given to 
qualified black troopers until the employer developed its own 
nondiscriminatory plan.49 When granting relief, the corrective 
plan “must unavoidably consider race.”50 
Paradise shows that broad, court-ordered injunctive relief 
is necessary because “the effects of past discrimination . . . ‘will not 
wither away of their own accord.’”51 For instance, allowing an 
employer to come up with its own integration plan may do little to 
prevent “the continuing effects” of discrimination if the courts have 
no mechanism to enforce the plan in the future.52 The injunctive 
approach is particularly essential when an employer has failed to 
correct the problem for decades; the FDNY has failed to do so 
arguably since its inception and at least since the district court 
recognized the Fire Department’s discriminatory practices in 
1973.53 The relief must be race-conscious because the alternatives, 
such as “an outright ban on hiring or promotions, or continued use 
of a discriminatory selection procedure,” are less appealing.54 
Of course, courts do not have unlimited leeway in 
determining what injunctive relief is appropriate, and at times 
the court in United States v. City of New York failed to pay 
heed to these limitations. Once the court determines that it 
should take some form of action, it must take care to ensure 
that its ordered plan is sufficiently narrow.55 The Supreme 
Court has articulated what factors are relevant in determining 
whether the plan is sufficiently narrow:  
(i) the efficacy of alternative remedies; (ii) the planned duration of 
the remedy; (iii) the relationship between the percentage of minority 
  
 47 Id. at 154 (quoting NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 705 (M.D. Ala. 
1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 48 Id. at 163 (quoting Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. 72, 74 (M.D. Ala. 1983)). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 194 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 51 Id. at 163 (majority opinion) (quoting Paradise, 585 F. Supp. at 75-76). 
 52 Id. (quoting Paradise, 585 F. Supp. at 75-76). 
 53 See id. at 166-67; supra Part III. 
 54 Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 450-
51, 464 (1986). 
 55 See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 187 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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workers to be employed and the percentage of minority group 
members in the relevant population or work force; (iv) the 
availability of waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be met; 
and (v) the effect of the remedy upon innocent third parties.56 
Under this analysis, the Court in Paradise found the 
lower court’s order to be sufficiently narrow. The Court 
emphasized that the length of the plan was appropriate 
because it was “contingent upon the Department’s own 
conduct.”57 The fifty percent hiring requirement acted as “an 
end date, which regulated the speed of progress toward 
fulfillment of the hiring goal.”58 In addition, the order did not 
place an absolute bar on white employees because it did not 
require that any of them be discharged,59 and it did not reduce 
the quality of workers promoted because they must all still be 
qualified.60 Ultimately, the court-imposed hiring scheme in 
Paradise was successful. After the order was implemented, the 
defendant had sufficient incentive to promptly submit a 
nondiscriminatory promotion method, and as a result, the race-
conscious court order was lifted shortly thereafter.61 Thus, the 
relief granted in Paradise established a successful template 
that the court in United States v. City of New York failed to 
adequately consider. 
Limits on injunctive relief are particularly salient when 
dealing with government entities. Missouri v. Jenkins set the 
outer limit for court control over local government through 
injunctive relief.62 There, the Supreme Court considered 
whether the district court had the power to direct an increase 
in local government taxes to ensure adequate funding for a 
desegregation plan.63 The Court noted that a “proper respect for 
the integrity and function of local government institutions” was 
a substantially important consideration.64 The Court found that 
  
 56 Id. (citations omitted). 
 57 Id. at 178 (majority opinion) (“The requirement endures only until the 
Department comes up with a procedure that does not have a discriminatory impact on 
blacks—something the Department was enjoined to do in 1972 and expressly promised 
to do by 1980.”). 
 58 Id. at 180 (citing Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 487-88 (Powell, J., 
concurring)). 
 59 Cf. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (finding disparate treatment 
where, by throwing out an entry-level exam after the applicants’ scores were already 
submitted, the white applicants were in a sense discharged). 
 60 See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 183. 
 61 See id. at 179. 
 62 495 U.S. 33 (1990). 
 63 Id. at 39. 
 64 Id. at 51. 
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the lower court, by imposing a tax increase in local 
government, completely circumvented local authority.65 The 
Court noted that the lower court had an equally viable and 
significantly less invasive alternative; it could have simply 
required local government “to levy property taxes at a rate 
adequate to fund the desegregation remedy.”66 The Court found 
that the “difference between these two approaches is far more 
than a matter of form.”67 Allowing local government to create its 
own remedy “protects the function of those institutions” and 
“places the responsibility for solutions . . . upon those who have 
themselves created the problems.”68 Jenkins demonstrates that 
the court in United States v. City of New York should have 
more seriously contemplated its alternatives before resorting to 
extensive oversight of the FDNY. 
There is leeway for a district court to influence the 
actions of local government, however, particularly when other 
methods proved unsuccessful. In United States v. Yonkers Board 
of Education, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
addressed whether the district court abused its discretion by 
refusing to adopt the City’s alternate proposal for remedying 
unconstitutional housing segregation, and by appointing a 
Housing Special Master.69 In rejecting the City’s contention, the 
Second Circuit thought it particularly significant that it had 
been eight years since the first order regarding remedial 
measures was entered, and there was little progress to show for 
it.70 The court also found that the City must come up with an 
alternative that the district court will find to 
“‘realistically . . . work now.’”71 Otherwise, the district court 
would not be obligated to consider those alternatives. With 
regards to a Special Hiring Master, the court found that 
although the City did not have final authority when 
disagreements arose, it did have the ability to appeal those 
decisions.72 Thus, the court found that the plan did not 
unnecessarily restrict the local government.73 By contrast, in 
  
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 29 F.3d 40 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 70 Id. at 44. 
 71 Id. at 43 (quoting Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cnty., Va., 391 U.S. 
430, 439 (1968)). 
 72 Id. at 44. 
 73 Id. Still, a court cannot simply refuse to entertain alternatives proposed by 
a local government. See Schwartz v. Dolan, 86 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that the 
 
1258 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:3 
United States v. City of New York, there was little demonstration 
that other alternatives did or would have failed, and it was 
apparent that the court heavily restricted the City’s affairs.74 
2. Ricci v. DeStefano and the Ebbing Support for 
Race-Conscious Injunctions 
The court in United States v. City of New York, by 
choosing not to enforce race-conscious hiring relief, was likely 
influenced by Ricci v. DeStefano.75 Ricci, while not explicitly 
contradicting or limiting race-conscious remedies—conveyed an 
attitude that Paradise-type relief may be falling out of favor. In 
Ricci, the Fire Department discarded a written exam after it had 
already been administered and the results submitted.76 
Consequently, white firefighters from the City of New Haven, 
Connecticut, filed suit for disparate treatment discrimination.77 
The Fire Department’s main defense was that it has been 
caught in a catch-22: in an effort to avoid discriminating against 
minorities it was forced to reject qualifying white applications.78 
In a five-to-four decision, Justice Kennedy, writing for 
the Court, held in favor of the disparate treatment claim, 
stating the decision to throw out the exam was made “because 
of race.”79 The Court held that an employer must have a “strong 
basis in evidence” that use of the test will lead to disparate-
impact liability, and the employer in Ricci did not meet that 
standard.80 Justice Scalia, concurring, made a prediction that 
disparate-impact claims may soon be extinct altogether.81 He 
argued that the majority’s decision only “postpones the evil day 
on which the Court will have to confront the question: 
Whether, or to what extent, are the disparate-impact 
provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 consistent 
with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection?”82 In 
furtherance of his argument, Scalia noted that the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents the 
  
local government should have been given an opportunity to have its proposal heard 
before the court). 
 74 See infra Part V. 
 75 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
 76 Id. at 2664. 
 77 Id.  
 78 Id.  
 79 Id. at 2676 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 2682-83 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 82 Id. at 2682. 
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government from discriminating on the basis on race.83 In 
addition, Scalia expressed his own distaste for disparate-
impact claims which, in his view, “place a racial thumb on the 
scales, often requiring employers to evaluate the racial 
outcomes of their policies, and to make decisions based on 
(because of) those racial outcomes.”84 
Lower courts sympathetic to Scalia’s views might be 
hesitant to implement any race-conscious injunctive relief for 
fear of being viewed as placing a “racial thumb” on the scales.85 
The court in United States v. City of New York actually 
attempted to separate itself from Ricci. There, the court had a 
narrow interpretation of Ricci: whether an employer could 
engage in disparate treatment, yet still avoid liability by 
arguing it did so in order to avoid disparate impact liability.86 
As a result, the court found that Ricci has no application—
including in United States v. City of New York—where the 
question is whether the employment practice “actually had a 
disparate impact.”87 While the court attempted to limit Ricci, its 
aversion to race-conscious hiring measures strongly suggests 
that the court sided with Scalia’s anti-affirmative action 
sentiments.88 As the next section demonstrates, however, the 
court was at best premature to adopt such an outlook. 
II. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND ITS CRITICS 
Affirmative action has a complex history in U.S. 
jurisprudence. Ever “since its inception in 1961, [it] has been 
under siege.”89 It has been attacked on several fronts: Presidential 
Executive Orders,90 theories of “color-blind[ness]”91 and “reverse 
discrimination,”92 hostility exemplified in academic articles and 
studies93 and state constitutional amendments banning 
  
 83 Id.; see also Darrell VanDeusen, VanDeusen on Ricci v. DeStefano and Its 
Aftermath, LEXSEE 2009 EMERGING ISSUES 4031, at 1, 8 (2009).  
 84 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2682. 
 85 Id. 
 86 United States v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 2d 77, 83 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 87 Id. 
 88 See infra Part IV.F. 
 89 andré douglas pond cummings, Commentary, The Associated Dangers of 
“Brilliant Disguises,” Color-Blind Constitutionalism, and Postracial Rhetoric, 85 IND. 
L.J. 1277, 1277 (2010).  
 90 See, e.g., id. at 1277 & n.1. 
 91 See, e.g., id. at 1277 & n.2. 
 92 See, e.g., id. at 1277 & n.3 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 93 See, e.g., id. at 1277 & n.5. 
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affirmative action.94 Barack Obama’s presidential election in 2008 
made many believe that “the United States ha[d] officially 
entered a postracial era.”95 Until this political movement directly 
and explicitly changes the broad range of Title VII remedies 
available, however, courts should not incorporate this sentiment 
into Title VII doctrine. In any event, the movement is ultimately 
flawed and should not be followed on its merits. 
While the movement does appear to have had some 
recent success in implementing these types of statutory 
changes on the state level, there has not been significant 
change on the federal level. Ward Connerly, a black Republican 
political activist who “spearheaded” the proposals for state 
constitutional amendments, believes that “[w]ithout any doubt, 
we have to understand that race preferences are on the way 
out.”96 Connerly argues that “it does not bode well for a civilized 
society that professes to believe in equality to countenance 
treating its citizens differently based on traits over which they 
have no control as a result of acquiring them by reason of 
birth.”97 Connerly also feels there are negative societal 
consequences in a society where “people can’t talk honestly 
about issues without somebody screaming about it. . . . [and] 
those who are the beneficiaries [of affirmative action] never 
want to let go. . . . [I]t becomes a crutch.”98 On November 2, 
2010, Arizona became the fifth state in the country to pass an 
anti-affirmative action amendment to its state constitution.99  
Proponents of a postracial society, or “[c]olorblindness,” 
hope to place race in a “vacuum,” removing it from societal 
consciousness.100 They argue that “‘racism is irrational’” since it 
is “‘unconnected from social reality’” and is nothing more than 
mere “‘physical presence.’”101 Adopting this philosophy would 
  
 94 See, e.g., id. at 1277 & n.6. 
 95 Id. at 1277 & nn.7-8. 
 96 Peter Slevin, Affirmative Action Foes Push Ballot Initiatives, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 26, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/25/ 
AR2008032502401.html.  
 97 A Candid Discussion About Racial Preferences, PRIMARY SOURCE: TUFTS’ J. 
CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT (Jan. 24, 2007), http://primarysource.typepad.com/main/2007/ 
01/a-candid-discus.html. 
 98 Id. 
 99 See Arizona Bans Affirmative Action, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Nov. 3, 2010, 3:00 
AM), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2010/11/03/arizona (“California, Michigan, 
Nebraska and Washington State have already imposed such bans.”). 
 100 Khaled Ali Beydoun, Without Color of Law: The Losing Race Against 
Colorblindness in Michigan, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 465, 486 (2007). 
 101 Id. (quoting Neil Gotanda, A Critique of the Constitution Is Colorblind, 44 
STANFORD L. REV. 1, 48 (1991)). 
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require courts to provide “a consistent and categorical 
application of the law” across racial lines.102 One goal of 
postracialists is to achieve a “pure meritocracy,” where one’s 
social standing is truly a result of inherent skill and 
perseverance, irrespective of race.103 Affirmative action arguably 
presents an “egregious affront” to this structure;104 by definition, 
affirmative action reduces the need for minorities to achieve, 
based on the traditional standards of merit.105 Because of this 
supposed imbalance, many proponents argue that affirmative 
action leads to unqualified candidates and leaves the 
“successful” minority candidates nevertheless stigmatized by 
their peers.106 Postracialists also reject race-based remedies 
because they believe that class-based injuries are often at the 
core of what we traditionally view as based on race.107 They also 
postulate that any advantages given to one race necessarily 
harms all others, resulting in a “zero-sum game.”108 Finally, 
they suggest that an imbalance is created when whites, who 
fear they will otherwise be confronted with “false accusations of 
racism,” decline to pursue reverse discrimination claims.109 
Although the movement has had some material gains in 
some states, their philosophy is ultimately flawed. At best, 
Connerly and his followers ignore how the implementation of a 
so-called postracial society will impact a nation that has 
focused on race throughout its history.110 At worst, postracialists 
actually help reinstate “a formal regime of White privilege.”111 
  
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 487 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 104 Id. at 488. 
 105 Especially when compared to their majority counterparts. 
 106 Beydoun, supra note 100, at 488; see also Tanya Kateri Hernandez, 
“Multiracial” Discourse: Racial Classifications in an Era of Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 
57 MD. L. REV. 97, 139-40 (1998).  
 107 See Sumi Cho, Critical Race Theory Speaker Series, CRT 20: Honoring Our 
Past, Charting Our Future: Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1602 (2009). 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. (citing RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, THE RACE CARD: HOW BLUFFING 
ABOUT BIAS MAKES RACE RELATIONS WORSE 339 (2008)). 
 110 See generally Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky, & Trina Jones, A Post-
Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967 (2010). 
 111 Beydoun, supra note 100, at 486. Critics have questioned the legitimacy 
and noted the hypocritical nature of the movement’s tactics. For example, Ward 
Connerly was likely chosen as a spokesperson against affirmative action “because of his 
identity as a Black man.” Id. at 489. In addition, critics note that Connerly receives a 
yearly salary of $1 million to perform these duties, suggesting that his motives may not 
necessarily be sincere. Id. Critics also note that the supporters of this movement 
largely stem from “a small group of wealthy and powerful rights [sic] wing corporate 
tycoons,” which suggests their motives may be in line with “trying to turn back the 
clock on civil rights . . . .” Id. at 490-91 (citing Lee Cokorinos, The Big Money Behind 
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First, a postracial society is simply too utopian an ideal to be 
successful in our current society. Second, even if a truly 
postracial society is possible, deep inequalities that are based 
on race still exist today.112 While postracialists point towards 
symbolically significant but nonetheless anecdotal evidence—
for example, President Obama’s presidency—as proof of a 
postracial society,113 significant statistical disparities still exist 
across the nation that are attributable to race.114 In addition, 
the forms of discrimination have become “more subtle and 
covert,” not lending themselves to straightforward detection by 
the public or statistical analysis.115 Unconscious discrimination 
permeates our daily lives, especially during “the course of 
reasoned evaluations.”116 Additionally, colorblindness, or “race-
neutral universalism,” is rarely applied universally and tends 
to benefit nonminorities disproportionately.117 Finally, the idea 
that we have entered a postracial era has been raised many 
times before—practically every time minorities have made 
significant strides—and those proclamations have almost 
universally been discredited.118 There is nothing to suggest that 
we have now developed the awareness and foresight necessary 
to determine whether race has become a nonissue. 
In sum, the politics of today need not erode the purposes 
and goals of remedies developed under federal and state law. 
While the tides of public opinion may have swayed as of late, 
  
Ward Connerly, EQUAL JUST. SOC’Y (May 26, 2005), http://www.equaljusticesociety.org/ 
Cokorinos_Connerly_BigMoney.pdf). 
 112 See Barnes et al., supra note 110; Cho, supra note 107; Devah Pager, The 
Use of Field Experiments for Studies of Employment Discrimination: Contributions, 
Critiques, and Directions for the Future, 609 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 104 
(2007); Reginald T. Shuford, Why Affirmative Action Remains Essential in the Age of 
Obama, 31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 503 (2009). 
 113 See Barnes et al., supra note 110, at 981-82. 
 114 See id. at 982-91 (noting that significant statistical disparities still exist in 
terms of poverty, income and wealth, homeownership, employment, education, and 
criminal justice statistics); see also Pager, supra note 112, at 107 (noting that “blacks, 
and young black men in particular, have become increasingly likely to drop out of the 
labor market altogether when faced with the prospect of long-term unemployment or 
marginal employment opportunities”). 
 115 Pager, supra note 112, at 105 (“It could be the case . . . that discrimination 
remains fairly routine in certain contexts, despite infrequent public exposure.”). 
 116 Id. at 108 (citations omitted).  
 117 Cho, supra note 107, at 1602 (citing john a. powell, Post-Racialism or 
Targeted Universalism?, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 785, 789-98 (2009)). For example, model 
recipients for the “G.I. Bill, welfare, and social security” are “white, able-bodied, and 
male.” Id. (citing powell, supra, at 794-98). 
 118 See Barnes et al., supra note 110, at 972 (“Almost from the moment the 
Civil War ended and the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery, there were 
declarations that the United States had moved beyond race.”). 
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there is nothing to suggest that courts—particularly federal 
courts and the great majority of state courts where affirmative 
action is still permitted—should lessen their resolve to provide 
race-conscious remedies. These remedies help achieve the very 
thing postracialists believe we already have—a society in which 
one’s race does not hamper one’s equal opportunity to succeed. 
III. HISTORY OF RACE DISCRIMINATION IN THE FDNY 
The long history of racial discrimination in the FDNY 
only emphasizes the need to implement impactful race-
conscious hiring in United States v. City of New York. In the 
1920s, Black firefighters needed strong resolve to last in the 
Fire Department. They lived—and literally slept—with 
reminders that they were not welcomed. For instance, while on 
overnight duty they were assigned to a “black bed” at the 
firehouse, “which whites refused to use even when no black 
firefighters were on duty.”119 Being a New York City Firefighter 
“tends to be a family business.”120 As a result, black and 
Hispanic citizens do not have the same access or 
encouragement to become part of the Fire Department. 
Black and Hispanic firefighters, however, were not 
without their champions. In 1940, Wesley Williams, the third 
black firefighter in the Fire Department,121 helped establish the 
Vulcan Society in an effort to draw the black-firefighter 
community together.122 By 1944, the Vulcan Society had 
successfully lobbied for regulations that banned racial 
discrimination—at least officially—within the Fire Department.123 
By the 1970s, overt racial discrimination had been 
supplanted by more subtle, yet equally virulent, racial 
discrimination. A typical experience for a black firefighter at 
this time was akin to that of “being in Archie Bunker’s living 
room.”124 They often found “racial epithets written on the 
  
 119 TERRY GOLWAY, SO OTHERS MIGHT LIVE: A HISTORY OF NEW YORK’S 
BRAVEST 203 (2002).  
 120 Tom Deignan, Is the FDNY Racist?, VOICES THAT MUST BE HEARD (Feb. 
23, 2005), http://www.indypressny.org/nycma/voices/158/editorials/editorials/. 
 121 GOLWAY, supra note 119, at 203; see also History of the Vulcan Society, 
VULCAN SOCIETY INC. FDNY: OFFICIAL WEB SITE OF THE VULCAN SOCIETY INC., 
http://www.vulcansocietyfdny.org/History.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2012). 
 122 History of the Vulcan Society, supra note 121; see also GOLWAY, supra note 
119, at 204. 
 123 History of the Vulcan Society, supra note 121; see also GOLWAY, supra note 
119, at 204. Although, “the black bed . . . persisted into the immediate postwar 
years . . . .” Id. at 205. 
 124 GOLWAY, supra note 119, at 277 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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firehouse blackboard,”125 and it was apparent that their “white 
colleagues were not particularly fond” of the “black 
neighborhoods.”126 In fact, in 1973 the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York found that the 
Fire Department discriminated against minorities, holding 
that the City’s entry-level exams had a disparate impact127 on 
minority firefighters.128 
Minority representation in the FDNY has not 
appreciably improved since 1973. In that year, only 5 percent of 
blacks and Hispanics made up the Fire Department while 
making up 32 percent of the general population.129 Between 
1991 and 2007, the percentage of black firefighters never 
exceeded 3.9 percent, and by 2007, had dropped to 3.4 
percent.130 In a 1999 census of minority firefighter 
representation in large American cities, New York ranked at 
the bottom of the list; New York minority firefighters were only 
one-tenth as represented in the FDNY relative to the city’s 
general population.131 Not surprisingly, a discrimination suit 
was again brought in 2007. 
IV. BACKGROUND AND ORDERS ISSUED THUS FAR IN UNITED 
STATES V. CITY OF NEW YORK 
A. Facts and Prior History 
In 2007, the United States, followed by the Vulcan Society 
of the New York Fire Department and individual plaintiffs, filed 
suit in District Court within the Eastern District of New York 
alleging that the Fire Department’s hiring practices violated 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.132 The focus of the 
complaint concerned two written exams that ranked prospective 
entry-level firefighters and significantly impacted hiring.133 
Plaintiffs argued that the tests had a disparate impact on black 
  
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 For a general discussion on the theory of disparate impact, see supra Part I.A. 
 128 See infra Part IV.A; Vulcan Soc’y of N.Y.C. Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Civil Serv. 
Comm’n, 360 F. Supp. 1265, 1272, 1275 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
 129 United States v. City of New York, 683 F. Supp. 2d 225, 241 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 242 (citations omitted). 
 132 Complaint ¶ 1, City of New York, No. 07-CV-2067 (E.D.N.Y. May 21, 2007), 
ECF No. 1; Intervenors’ Complaint ¶ 1, City of New York, No. 07-CV-2067 (E.D.N.Y. 
July 17, 2007), 2007 WL 3117053, ECF No. 48. 
 133 Complaint ¶ 1, City of New York, No. 07-CV-2067 (E.D.N.Y. May 21, 2007), 
ECF No. 1. 
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and Hispanic applicants.134 The Vulcan Society also argued that 
the continued racial disparities in the Fire Department 
amounted to disparate treatment and that defendants “have 
been long-aware of the discriminatory impact” their examination 
process has had on blacks.135 The Vulcan Society alleged that 
defendants “continued rel[ying] on and perpetuat[ing] . . . these 
racially discriminatory hiring processes.”136 
The entry-level exams for New York City firefighters 
have been under scrutiny for some time. In 1973, the city’s 
entry-level exams were similarly found to have had a disparate 
impact on minority firefighters.137 In fact, the court in United 
States v. City of New York found the testing procedures used 
during the 1973 decision to be “strikingly similar to the testing 
procedures in this case.”138 In addition, the defendants in the 
1973 decision “failed to . . . demonstrat[e] that the examination 
was job-related,” which had “the quality of déjà vu” when 
compared to the current action.139 The 1973 court ordered the 
City to hire one-third minority applicants until they were able to 
develop a new, nondiscriminatory test.140 The City also hired a 
private consulting firm to help develop the tests.141  
Only three years later, however, the City abandoned 
their relationship with the private consulting firm purportedly 
because of a “fiscal crisis.”142 The City also failed to follow the 
minority hiring requirement and instead “instituted a hiring 
procedure that required . . . minimum appointment 
requirements such as college credits, a driver’s license, and 
certified first responder with defibrillation training.”143 The 
2012 court found that any effect the 1973 decision had on 
minority hiring “constituted little more than a brief departure 
from an otherwise relentless pattern” of discrimination.144 
  
 134 Id. 
 135 Intervenors’ Complaint ¶ 51, City of New York, No. 07-CV-2067 (E.D.N.Y. 
July 17, 2007), 2007 WL 3117053, ECF No. 48.  
 136 Id., cited in City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 2d 77 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).  
 137 See City of New York, 683 F. Supp. 2d 225, 238 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing 
Vulcan Soc’y of N.Y.C. Fire Dep’t, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 1265, 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)). The 
court notes this case “furnishes proof of an old adage: the more things change, the more 
they remain the same.” Id. 
 138 Id. at 239. 
 139 Id. at 240. 
 140 Id. (citing Vulcan Soc’y of N.Y.C. Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 
490 F.2d 387, 391 (2d Cir. 1973)). 
 141 Id. at 241 (citing Berkman v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp. 177, 184 n.1 
(E.D.N.Y. 1982)). 
 142 Id. (citing Berkman, 536 F. Supp. at 184). 
 143 Id. (citation omitted). 
 144 Id.  
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B. Disparate Impact Decision 
On July 22, 2009, the court in United States v. City of 
New York found that the entry-level exams—Written 
Examinations 7029 and 2043—had a disparate impact on black 
and Hispanic applicants in violation of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.145 
Both exams were “an 85-question, paper-and-pencil 
multiple choice test” administered from 1999 through 2002 and 
from 2002 through 2007, respectively.146 Passing either exam 
was a prerequisite for taking the physical performance test 
(PPT).147 The applicants were ranked in order by combining the 
results of both the written and physical tests.148 About 1750 
black applicants and 2125 Hispanic applicants took exam 
7029.149 Only 104 (3.2 percent) blacks were hired from those 
who took the exam.150 Also, black applicants passed the exam 
only 67 percent as often as white applicants.151 This “disparity 
[amounted] to 33.9 units of standard deviation,”152 which means 
the probability the disparity “occurred by chance [was] less 
than 1 in 4.5 million-billion.”153 In addition, only 274 (8.5 
percent) Hispanics who took the exam were hired.154 Hispanic 
candidates passed the exam 85.3 percent as often as white 
candidates.155 “[T]his disparity is equivalent to 17.4 units of 
standard deviation, meaning that the likelihood it occurred by 
chance is less than 1 in 4.5 million-billion.”156 A similar set of 
statistics was present for Exam 2043.157 
The court found that there were no “material factual 
disputes sufficient to preclude summary judgment on job-
relatedness.”158 The court stated that “the City tested for tasks 
and abilities that could be learned on the job,”159 rather than 
  
 145 City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 2d 77, 82-83 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).  
 146 Id. at 84-85. 
 147 Id. at 85. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. at 86.  
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. at 88. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. (citations omitted). 
 154 Id. at 86. 
 155 Id. at 88-89. 
 156 Id. (citations omitted). 
 157 See id. at 89-90. 
 158 Id. at 110. 
 159 Id. at 113 (citations omitted).  
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measuring tasks and abilities that “are needed at entry.”160 In 
addition, the court found that “the City [did] not offer[] any 
evidence of a competent test construction process . . . . 
Instead, . . . . the City appear[ed] to be relying on the same 
practices for which it was criticized by the Second Circuit thirty 
years ago.”161 The court also found the City “fail[ed] to test various 
cognitive and non-cognitive abilities . . . [and] fail[ed] to show that 
the examinations had an appropriate reading level.”162 Finally, the 
court found that a reasonable fact-finder could not conclude that 
exams had the “reliability or validity” necessary to refute the 
statistical claims.163 In sum, the court found that the exams—in 
which a disproportionate number of black and Hispanics had 
failed—did not adequately predict future performance. Therefore, 
the court found that the exams had a disparate impact on black 
and Hispanic applicants.164 
C. Disparate Treatment Decision 
On January 13, 2010, the court also found that the City 
engaged in systematic disparate treatment.165 The court stated 
the exams were “part of a pattern, practice, and policy of 
intentional discrimination against black applicants that has 
deep historical antecedents and uniquely disabling effects.”166 
The plaintiffs were able to establish their prima facie case 
primarily through “undisputed statistical and anecdotal 
evidence.”167 The large standard deviation in racial disparity—
from 10.5 to 33.9 units—made the statistical evidence legally 
significant,168 and the statistical evidence was 
“supplemented . . . [by] showing with extensive historical, 
anecdotal, and testimonial evidence that intentional 
discrimination was the City’s ‘standard operating procedure.’”169 
The City made no attempt to show that the plaintiffs’ 
proof was either “inaccurate or insignificant” by questioning its 
  
 160 Id. (citations omitted). 
 161 Id. at 116. 
 162 Id. at 123. 
 163 Id. at 131. 
 164 Id. 
 165 City of New York, 683 F. Supp. 2d 225, 233 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 166 Id. at 273. 
 167 Id. at 251. 
 168 Id. at 236. 
 169 Id. at 250 (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 
336 (1977)). 
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“source, accuracy, or probative force.”170 Instead, the City 
attempted (and failed) to show that it had no “subjective intent to 
discriminate.”171 Therefore, the court found that the defendants 
engaged in disparate treatment based on a pattern and practice of 
discrimination172 and left the form of relief to the remedial stage.173 
D. Preliminary Injunction Decision 
On June 29, 2010, the City stated that it “expect[ed] to 
hire approximately 300 new firefighters” from a new test, 
“Exam 6019.”174 Plaintiffs were able to demonstrate, however, 
that this new exam would still produce a disparity between 
black and white applicants’ pass rates—estimated at 22.70 
units of standard deviation.175 The plaintiffs also demonstrated 
that Hispanics and white applicants’ pass rates would be 
separated by 11.35 units of standard deviation.176 The court was 
persuaded that this potential disparity was more than 
sufficient to show that a prima facie case would be met if 
litigation was brought regarding the new exam.177 
The court also found that the City would be unable to 
raise a proper business necessity defense, since it still could not 
successfully demonstrate that a higher test score, by as much 
as three points, detected any marked increase in an applicant’s 
actual skill as an entry-level firefighter.178 In addition, the City 
failed to demonstrate that the new exam was “content valid.”179 
As a result, the court enjoined any further hiring by the City 
under the new exam until October 1, 2010, giving the court 
time to develop an interim hiring plan that would not violate 
federal or state discrimination laws.180 
  
 170 Id. at 253-55 (quoting Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 
147, 158 n.4 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
 171 Id. at 251.  
 172 Id. at 255. 
 173 Id. at 273. 
 174 Letter from James M. Lemonedes, City of New York, No. 07-CV-2067 
(E.D.N.Y. June 29, 2010), ECF No. 456. 
 175 City of New York, 731 F. Supp. 2d 291, 300 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. at 301. 
 178 Id. at 315.  
 179 That is, the exam failed to test specific knowledge necessary for entry-level 
firefighters to possess. Id. 
 180 Id. 
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E. Interim Hiring Decision 
On September 13, 2010, the court offered several hiring 
alternatives from which the City was to choose, most or all of 
which contained race-conscious adjustments to the Exam 6019 
rankings.181 The court emphasized it had the power to issue 
broad relief to combat past discrimination; “the district court 
‘has not merely the power but the duty’ to ‘bar like 
discrimination in the future.’”182 The proposals included 
variations of “random selection” procedures, where a specified 
pool of qualified applicants (avoiding the lowest-scoring 
candidates) would be hired at random, as well as “applicant 
flow” procedures.183 
The “random selection” proposals included race-conscious 
adjustments.184 For example, one proposal allowed the white 
applicants who were ranked at the bottom 2500 candidates to be 
replaced by minority candidates who were just below the 2500 
mark, and this new pool would be used to select candidates at 
random.185 While the court admitted that “the rank-adjustment 
proposal [was] a race-conscious compliance measure,” the court 
had no doubt that the proposal was lawful.186 Indeed, “[a]n 
unbroken string of Supreme Court and Second Circuit case law 
confirm[ed] that race-conscious remedial compliance measures 
are permissible under Title VII.”187 
The “applicant flow” procedures arguably had a more 
blatant race-conscious component; the City could hire using 
“any criteria [it] desired” as long as it did so in proportion to 
the minority representation of the applicant pool.188 The court 
recognized that “these proposals [also] strongly resemble[d] 
  
 181 See City of New York, No. 07-CV-2067, 2010 WL 3709350, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 13, 2010) (admitting that “[t]here is no question that the rank-adjustment 
proposal” along with its other proposals, are “race-conscious compliance measure[s]”). 
 182 Id. at *3 (quoting Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)). 
 183 Id. at *5, *12. 
 184 Id. at *5-12 (discussing the random selection procedures). 
 185 Id. at *6. 
 186 Id. at *7. Although the City disagreed. See id. at *7 n.8; Supplement to 
Special Master’s Report at 1, City of New York, No. 07-CV-2067, (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 
2010), ECF No. 522. 
 187 City of New York, 2010 WL 3709350, at *7 (citing Local 28 of Sheet Metal 
Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 450-51, 464 (1986); United States v. 
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 (1987)). 
 188 Id. at *12. 
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racial hiring quotas,” but believed that precedent allowed this 
procedure.189 
The court was partially persuaded by the fact that the 
City proclaimed its “current fiscal condition may . . . be such 
that it cannot reasonably bear the costs of further firefighter 
hiring delays.”190 A major advantage of the court-proposed 
interim hiring procedures was that they could be implemented 
in a matter of weeks rather than months or even years.191 
F. The City’s Rejection of Interim Hiring and the Court’s 
Response 
On September 17, 2010, the City enigmatically ignored 
all of its previous financial and safety concerns. In a letter to 
the presiding judge, the City stated that “[e]very one of the five 
proposals from which the Court [was] allowing the city to select 
involve[d] some form of race-based quota.”192 The defendants 
recognized that, as a consequence, the City would not be 
“permitted to hire any entry level firefighters for the duration 
of the ‘temporary injunction.’”193 The City would simply try to 
make a valid examination “as expeditiously as possible.”194 
The court—with unambiguous distaste for the City’s 
tactics195—“permanently enjoin[ed] the City from hiring 
firefighters based on the results of Exam 6019.”196 The court 
found that the City’s refusal to follow the court’s order was 
“compelling evidence that enjoining the City from hiring off 
that test, except according to one of the Hiring Options, would 
not unduly burden the City . . . .”197 
Thus, the court did not require the City to implement 
any of the offered interim hiring procedures.198 Instead, the 
  
 189 Id. at *14 (citing Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 478 U.S. at 
450-51, 464; Paradise, 480 U.S. at 166; Guardians Ass’n of the N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, Inc. 
v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 630 F.2d 79, 109 (1980)). 
 190 Id. at *15. 
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 192 Letter from Michael A. Cardozo, City of New York, No. 07-CV-2067 
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 195 Indeed, the court contemplated “sanctions either pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 11 or the court’s inherent power.” City of New York, No. 07-CV-2067, 
2010 WL 4137536, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2010) (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 
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 197 Id. at *8. 
 198 Id. at *2.  
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court enjoined any immediate hiring and gave the City the 
option to change its mind at any time, leaving the plaintiffs, 
and everyone else who spent a significant amount of time 
preparing and taking entry-level exams 7029 and 2043, 
without any legitimate hiring opportunities in the interim.199 
Although the court was aware that the City’s “shifting and 
contradictory positions”200 were “simply the latest episode in the 
City’s long campaign to avoid responsibility for discrimination 
in its Fire Department, whatever the cost,”201 it left the City to 
come up with its own nondiscriminatory procedure. The court 
chose not to enforce any of its temporary hiring procedures 
despite the fact that even the City “now implicitly accept[ed] 
that the court has the authority to order quotas in the 
appropriate circumstances.”202 
G. Subsequent Motion by the Plaintiffs for Compensatory 
and Injunctive Relief 
On December 19, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a 
proposed order for injunctive and monetary relief.203 The 
plaintiffs requested that the court appoint a “Special Monitor 
to oversee compliance with the Court’s Order.”204 The plaintiffs 
also requested specific injunctive relief, including a 
requirement that the Fire Department administer an entry-
level exam every two years rather than every four.205 This 
frequency would alleviate the fact that blacks and Hispanics 
are less likely to be aware of the exam or exam date.206 
In addition, the plaintiffs moved for the court to order 
the Fire Department to enhance their minority recruitment 
and publicity programs.207 In doing so, the Fire Department 
should “ensure that blacks, Hispanics, and whites are equally 
informed about employment opportunities . . . .”208 The goal 
  
 199 See id. 
 200 Id. at *1. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. at *7. 
 203 Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs-Intervenors’ Proposed Order 
for Injunctive Relief, City of New York, No. 07-CV-2067 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2010), 2010 
WL 6917514, ECF No. 596.  
 204 Id. at 2, 6 (arguing that “District Courts have the authority to appoint a 
Special Master or Monitor when broad injunctive relief is ordered” (citing United 
States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 29 F.3d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1994))).  
 205 Id. at 7-8. 
 206 Id. at 8.  
 207 Id. at 8-9. 
 208 Id. at 9. 
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would be to have an applicant pool that is “representative of 
the racial and ethnic makeup of the age-eligible residents of 
New York City.”209 Such a plan included retaining an expert 
recruitment consultant, employing thirty full-time recruiters, 
and providing for an adequate budget.210 The plan would also 
include quality test-preparation courses that are “[f]ree and 
[a]ccessible” to minority applicants.211 
The plaintiffs also sought to implement changes to the 
postexam candidate screening process.212 The plaintiffs noted 
that minority candidates who were eligible for consideration 
were screened out “at much higher rates than white 
candidates.”213 This disparity occurred because the Fire 
Department often failed to successfully notify minority 
candidates about their “initial candidate screening intake 
interview,”214 and others were disproportionately scrutinized for 
“arrests that did not result in convictions.”215 In addition, the 
plaintiffs requested that the Fire Department should have a 
system in place for monitoring and preventing retaliation and 
workplace discrimination against minority firefighters.216 
H. The Court Finds Continued Supervision Necessary to 
Eliminate Recruiting and Hiring Racial Discrimination 
in the Fire Department 
On September 30, 2011, the court issued a 
Memorandum and Findings of Fact highlighting many of the 
issues that remain with regards to the Fire Department’s 
hiring and recruiting processes, creating a strong impression 
that the entry-level exams only reach the surface of the Fire 
  
 209 Id. 
 210 Id. at 12-14. 
 211 Id. at 15. 
 212 Id. at 16-17. 
 213 Id. at 17. 
 214 Id. at 17-18 (noting that minorities were generally harder to reach because 
their addresses changed more often, but little was done to try to ensure notice when it 
was apparent the addresses were incorrect). 
 215 Id. at 17; see also Dave Saltonstall, Bravest’s Hiring Under Fire Minorities 
Seek Larger Numbers on Force That’s 93% White, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.C.), May 2, 1999 
(noting that family members of firefighters receive help with “training and surviving the 
required background checks that minority firefighters say are often used to keep them 
out of the department. Such checks . . . have snared black candidates for jumping subway 
turnstiles as kids, while whites with more troubling records are allowed to pass.”). 
 216 Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs-Intervenors’ Proposed Order 
for Injunctive Relief at 24-28, City of New York, 07-CV-2067 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2010), 
2010 WL 6917514, ECF No. 596.  
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Department’s discriminatory practices.217 The court found the 
need for an attrition-mitigation plan for its entry-level hiring 
process.218 The elongated hiring process made black candidates 
40 percent more likely than white candidates to eventually be 
disqualified.219 The court noted several other areas of concern 
that needed to be addressed, including setting measurable 
goals and ensuring continued support.220 
In essence, the court found the City unwilling to address 
the issue and thus felt the need to impose a structure for 
remedial measures. Indeed, the court felt that if the City had 
“shown the least bit of concern . . . this would be a much 
different order.”221 The court based this conclusion in part on the 
amount of time that had passed in this litigation—four years—
rather than the amount of time that an actual plan has been 
implemented, which had not yet occurred. Thus, although the 
remedial phase of the litigation was in its opening stages, the 
City was not given an opportunity to implement its own plan. 
The Order itself called for extensive oversight by 
multiple independent parties, and required the City to explain 
itself when it disagreed with the independent parties.222 For 
example, an independent Court Monitor was appointed, and 
the City could not take “any step in any process for the 
selection of entry-level firefighters . . . without first obtaining 
the approval of the Court Monitor.”223 In addition, the City must 
“retain an independent recruitment consultant . . . subject to 
the approval of the Court Monitor,” who, among other things, 
“identifies best practices for the recruitment of black and 
Hispanic” applicants.224 The City must also come up with a plan 
to prevent “voluntary” attrition.225 
The Order also imposes extensive record-keeping and 
document retention measures and gives the Court Monitor 
broad authority to request on “short notice” any document or 
investigation of any individual it deems relevant.226 Any 
employee, including unpaid interns, who are “formally or 
  
 217 Memorandum [and] Findings of Fact, City of New York, 07-CV-2067 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011), ECF No. 741. 
 218 Id. at 13-14.  
 219 Id. at 15. 
 220 Id. at 24-39.  
 221 Id. at 18. 
 222 City of New York, 07 Civ. 2067, 2011 WL 6131136 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2011). 
 223 Id. at *4. 
 224 Id. at *6. 
 225 Id. at *7 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 226 Id. at *13, *15-16. 
1274 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:3 
informally” involved in the hiring process of an entry-level 
firefighter must “immediately create a written record of all oral 
communications in which they are involved” relating to such 
conversations.227 In addition, the City must appoint an 
independent EEO consultant, who will produce a report that, 
among other things, “identifies all tasks the EEO Office should 
be performing to ensure the FDNY’s compliance with 
applicable equal employment opportunity laws.”228 Most 
notably, the Order is enforceable for up to ten years, unless 
upon the second civil service hiring list, the City is essentially 
able to show that there currently is no disparate impact or 
treatment, and there is no reason to believe that such 
discrimination would present itself in the near future.229 
The court explicitly refused to entertain alternatives to 
this extensive oversight. Indeed, despite the court’s previous 
attempt to implement race-conscious hiring measures, it 
emphasized that the Order “does not impose hiring quotas in 
any shape or form,” and that “this court has never endorsed 
hiring quotas . . . it does not believe quotas would be an 
effective remedy to the City’s discrimination.”230 From this 
context, it is apparent that the decision to impose extensive 
oversight so early in the remedial phase was due to the court’s 
unjustified aversion to race-conscious hiring. 
V. UNITED STATES V. CITY OF NEW YORK PROPOSED AN 
INSUFFICIENT REMEDIAL PLAN AND PREMATURELY 
IMPOSED RESTRAINTS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
In United States v. City of New York, the court initially 
failed to fully exercise its duty to remedy long-institutionalized 
racial disparity. Subsequently, the court overstepped its bounds 
by not respecting local government independence over federal 
courts. When “proposing” its interim plan for relief, the court 
should have created a plan that required a greater ratio of race-
conscious hiring and should have imposed it despite the City’s 
objections. Instead, after the City rejected the interim plan, the 
court severely limited the City’s control over its own hiring 
practices by imposing extensive oversight. While there is 
  
 227 Id. at *8. 
 228 Id. at *11. 
 229 Id. at *17-18. 
 230 Memorandum [and] Findings of Fact at 20, City of New York, 07-CV-2067 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011), ECF No. 741. 
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potential for the current plan to address many of the deep-
seated racial issues in the FDNY, it unnecessarily does so at the 
expense of local government’s control over its own affairs.  
A. The Interim Relief of Race-Conscious Hiring Practices 
When the court offered several interim hiring plans 
from which the City could choose (but ultimately rejected), the 
plans should have been more expansive in order for them to 
effectively eradicate racial discrimination. In addition, it was 
within the court’s power to issue a preliminary injunction 
ordering, rather than asking, that the City follow these 
proposed hiring procedures.231 
1. The Proposed Hiring Procedures Should Have 
Required a Greater Ratio of Minority Firefighters 
Under each proposal, the number of black and Hispanic 
candidates passing the test must have been a “Representative 
Pool”232 of all the applicants. In other words, the percentage of 
black and Hispanics who pass the entry-level exam should be 
equal to the percentage of black and Hispanic applicants who 
take the exam. On its face, this proposal would provide a 
measure of remedy for the particular applicants who had 
brought a claim. The proposal fails, however, to adequately 
address the extensive discriminatory effects of the Fire 
Department’s actions in two respects. 
First, requiring that the Fire Department hire a 
“Representative Pool” of the applicants fails to provide relief to 
the greater minority population because the number of 
minority applicants was insufficient in itself. Minorities have 
understandably been discouraged from applying to the Fire 
Department after witnessing decades of minority applicants 
who fell short of success.233 In order to address the long history 
of discrimination, a greater minority hiring ratio—that of the 
age-eligible local population—is required.234 This ratio would 
  
 231 See supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text; United States v. Paradise, 
480 U.S. 149, 180 (1987). 
 232 City of New York, No. 07-CV-2067, 2010 WL 3709350, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 
13, 2010) (defining “Representative Pool” to mean “that the subgroup’s racial 
demographics reflect the racial demographics of the entire applicant pool”). 
 233 See supra Part III. 
 234 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs-Intervenors’ Proposed 
Order for Injunctive Relief at 7-12, City of New York, No. 07-CV-2067, 2010 WL 
6917514 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2010).  
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better represent the potential applicants that would have 
applied had the City not engaged in disparate treatment, which 
in turn would help alleviate the long-term effects of 
discrimination. 
Second, even considering the court’s modest goal of 
reaching the ratio of minority applicants, it will take a 
significant (if not an indefinite) amount of time for the entire 
Fire Department—rather than just the newest, entry-level 
firefighters—to reach the desired minority ratio.235 In essence, 
most nonminority firefighters hired before this plan would 
have to retire or resign in order for the appropriate ratio to be 
reached. In addition, considering that this measure, if 
implemented, would have been only temporary, minority 
representation would not have significantly increased during 
that limited time. As a result, the ultimate goal of the plan 
would not have been reached since the City would have had 
little incentive to promptly come up with an examination 
procedure that lacked disparate impact. 
Indeed, the “relevant population or work force,” rather 
than the relevant applicant pool, is traditionally used as the 
standard ratio for race-conscious hiring.236 It is within the 
court’s scope to use the relevant population or work force as a 
point of comparison, since “eradicat[ing] race discrimination 
may include reasonable race-conscious relief that benefits 
individuals who were not actual victims of discrimination.”237 
This type of ratio would do much to address the long history of 
discrimination in the Fire Department. It would ensure that 
  
 235 See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 180 (holding that a “one-for-one” promotion 
requirement would “have determined how quickly the Department progressed toward 
[the] ultimate goal”). There, the Court found that “[s]ome promptness in the 
administration of relief was plainly justified” where the previous “use of deadlines or 
end dates had proved ineffective.” Id. In that case, the implementation of a “one-for-
one” ratio, where it was determined that the labor pool was twenty-five percent black, 
“was crafted and applied flexibly, [and] was constitutionally permissible.” Id. 
 236 Id. at 187. See, e.g., Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 
561, 565 (1984) (where the employer agreed to “adopt[] the long-term goal of increasing 
the proportion of minority representation in each job classification in the Fire 
Department to approximate[] the proportion of blacks in the labor force” (emphasis 
added)); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 199 (1979) (upholding an 
agreement that “50% of the new trainees were to be black until the percentage of black 
skilled craftworkers in the Gramercy plant approximated the percentage of blacks in the 
local labor force” (emphasis added)). 
 237 Local Number 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 
501, 516 (1986); see also Paradise, 480 U.S. at 184 (recognizing that “the choice of 
remedies to redress racial discrimination is ‘a balancing process left, within 
appropriate constitutional or statutory limits, to the sound discretion of the trial court’” 
(citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 508 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring))). 
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integration of minority firefighters would occur at a sufficient 
pace. In addition, the rate of integration would remain 
consistent even if minority applicants continued to be 
discouraged from becoming firefighters.238 
The greater ratio also helps prevent future disparate 
impact discrimination, which was one of the court’s main 
goals.239 If the minority applicant ratio were applied, the Fire 
Department would be incentivized to dissuade minorities from 
applying in the first place since it would reduce the impact of 
the interim hiring plan. If the Fire Department engaged in this 
activity, however, it would create an acute possibility of future 
disparate impact and treatment liability.240 On the other hand, 
a hiring ratio based on the general population would eliminate 
that incentive. Indeed, the general population ratio would 
actually dissuade the City from such a practice because it 
would only serve to reduce the pool of minority firefighters 
from which they could choose—thus lowering the chances that 
the new hires would be the highest qualified. 
This higher ratio would not “trammel the rights” of 
white employees,241 nor would it put the qualifications of the 
accepted applicants into question. The court’s reasoning for 
interim relief still holds in this respect.242 There, the court felt 
the hiring procedures were not “likely to upset the expectations 
of the Qualified Candidates, white and minority alike” because 
“a high percentage of the [so-called] Qualified Candidates will 
be appointed to one of the next two firefighter classes.”243 By 
ensuring that all the candidates are “qualified”244 and that 
  
 238 A hiring ratio based on the number of applicants might incentivize the Fire 
Department to discourage minorities from applying; reducing the pool of minority 
applicants would in turn reduce the number of minority entry-level firefighters they 
would have to hire. This tactic would have no impact, however, on a hiring ratio based 
on minority representation in the local population. 
 239 See supra Part I.B; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975). 
 240 Plaintiffs could bring a disparate treatment or disparate impact claim 
against the Fire Department regarding its recruitment of minority applicants. Even if 
the Fire Department ultimately hired a sufficient ratio of minorities, this event would 
not preclude a disparate impact claim because the “bottom line defense” is not a 
legitimate defense against disparate impact claims. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 
440, 442 (1982). 
 241 See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 183 (noting that any promotion requirement 
would give an advantage to black applicants, the “situation is only temporary, and is 
subject to amelioration by the action of the Department itself”). 
 242 See United States v. City of New York, No. 07-CV-2067, 2010 WL 3709350, 
at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2010) (addressing interim hiring). 
 243 Id. 
 244 Paradise, 480 U.S. at 183 (“[T]he basic limitation, that black troopers 
promoted must be qualified, remains. Qualified white candidates simply have to 
compete with qualified black candidates.”). 
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white employees do not face an “absolute bar” from 
employment,245 the court would be able to institute temporary 
relief that allows for a greater ratio of black and Hispanic 
workers to be hired. 
In addition, such a hiring procedure would actually help 
keep race-conscious relief a temporary measure. Because the 
hiring would create a substantial and predictable inflow of 
minority firefighters, the procedure would have a substantial 
effect—enough to encourage the City to develop a 
nondiscriminatory test that the court could accept. The 
incentives to develop an acceptable test would persist even if 
the City’s intentions for doing so were dubious. For example, 
because a nondiscriminating test does not necessarily mean 
that the ratio of the eligible population will be hired,246 the 
City—in an effort to reduce minority integration—may 
calculate that developing their own court-approved exam will 
actually slow the integration of minority firefighters. 
The City opposed hiring blacks at a ratio matching the 
percentage of blacks that are age-eligible within the City. The 
City first argued that some of these members will inevitably 
“self select out because they know they do not meet some of the 
unassailably objective criteria for being a firefighter.”247 This 
argument is at best incomplete, because it does not provide any 
legitimate reason why potential black applicants would “select 
out” at a higher rate than white applicants. The City also 
suggests that “[n]o matter how effective the FDNY’s 
recruitment efforts are, and no matter how positively an FDNY 
career is viewed in diverse communities, at the end of the day 
firefighting will not be everyone’s career choice.”248 This 
statement implies that blacks are simply not as interested in 
becoming firefighters. However, such an argument must be 
  
 245 See id. at 182 (stating that an “‘absolute bar’ to white advancement” does 
not exist where “50% of those elevated were white” and the procedure “does not require 
the layoff and discharge of white employees” (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 
476 U.S. 267, 283 (1986))). The Court in Wygant notes that “layoffs impose the entire 
burden of achieving racial equality on particular individuals, often resulting in serious 
disruption of their lives.” 476 U.S. at 283. 
 246 The disparity will generally need to be between two to three standard 
deviations away from the eligible population for a disparate impact claim to be 
successful, which leaves room for the “neutral” test to have results that are somewhat 
below the ratio of minorities in the relevant population. See supra note 19 and 
accompanying text. 
 247 Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs-Intervenors’ 
Motion for a Proposed Order for Injunctive Relief at 18, City of New York, No. 07-CV-
2067 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2010), 2010 WL 6917516, ECF No. 599. 
 248 Id. 
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supported by strong evidence that is not based on stereotypical 
belief.249 Here, not only does the City fail to provide such 
evidence, but it also fails to rebut the presumption that many 
minorities have been discouraged specifically because of the 
intentional discrimination250 that has existed in the Fire 
Department for decades.251 
2. The Court Should Have Required Implementation of 
an Interim Hiring Procedure Rather Than Issue a 
Permanent Injunction and a Subsequent Intensive 
Oversight Program 
A race-conscious hiring procedure (using either ratio) 
would have been preferable over the court’s permanent 
injunction because of the injunction’s effect upon third-party 
bystanders. The injunction forced all the applicants who took 
entry-level exams 7029 and 2043 to bear the costs of the finding 
of discrimination. None of the applicants who took these exams 
will be able to begin employment for an indefinite period of 
time. Even if a hiring procedure came close to “trammel[ing] the 
rights” of white employees252—for example, by hiring little or no 
white firefighters for a specified time period—there would still 
be a substantial benefit in allowing the current plaintiffs some 
form of immediate relief. The permanent injunction, on the 
other hand, leaves all the applicants with no prospects of 
employment, as now they all must wait for the City to develop 
an adequate exam.253 If the court intended to use this delay to 
allow the City to work on a more effective plan, it could have 
instead simply implemented a temporary race-conscious hiring 
procedure and let the City use the subsequent time to come up 
with a more permanent solution. 
In addition, the injunction did not create sufficient 
incentive for the City to develop a nondiscriminatory exam. If 
the court does not accept the City’s new proposals, the court 
  
 249 EEOC v. O & G Spring & Wire Forms Specialty Co., 38 F.3d 872, 876-77 
(7th Cir. 1994) (an employer cannot simply assert that the racial disparity is based on 
lack of interest without providing closely scrutinized evidence); cf. EEOC v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 313-14 (1988) (employer successfully argued with 
extensive evidence that women were not interested in becoming salespersons). 
 250 The court acknowledges that such discrimination exists. See City of New 
York, 683 F. Supp. 2d 225, 241 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 251 See supra Part III. 
 252 See supra note 241 and accompanying text. 
 253 City of New York, No. 07-CV-2067, 2010 WL 4137536, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 
19, 2010). 
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would be again forced to offer interim race-conscious hiring 
procedures before the City could commence hiring. Given the 
fact that the court’s proposals as constituted would not have a 
significant impact over time,254 the consequences for the City 
are small if it does not produce an adequate exam. 
B. The Court Overzealously and Prematurely Imposed 
Restraints on Local Government 
Despite the apparent difficulty the court faced in getting 
the City to cooperate with its interim hiring plan, the court was 
overzealous and premature in developing an extensive oversight 
system. While the plan allows the City to have its proposals heard 
before the court and provides for the ability to take appeal—and 
thus does not on its face violate the limits on local government 
outlined in Missouri v. Jenkins255 and Schwartz v. Dolan256—the 
plan was implemented too soon and puts into question the City’s 
practical ability to effect such proposals. 
The limits on injunctive relief set forth in Paradise shed 
light on this plan.257 A significant factor in determining whether 
injunctive relief is too broad is the planned duration of the 
remedy.258 Here, the plan could last as long as ten years. 
Admittedly, the length of the plan is somewhat “contingent 
upon the [City’s] own conduct,” as it was in Paradise;259 the 
court could relinquish its control if the City were able to meet 
certain goals.260 The goals the City must reach, however, are 
unrealistic. For example, the City must prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that it does not and will not use 
“any examination that in any way results in a disparate 
impact” and must be job-related or required by business 
necessity.261 Even with earnest intentions and generous 
resources, no amount of evidence can definitively pronounce 
that future examinations will not have a disparate impact. A 
proposed change in any step of the examination procedure, up 
to and including the examination questions, can have an 
unexpectedly profound effect on the results. 
  
 254 See infra Part V.A.1. 
 255 495 U.S. 33 (1990). 
 256 86 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 1996); see supra notes 62-73.  
 257 United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987). 
 258 Id. at 187. 
 259 Id. at 178. 
 260 United States v. City of New York, No. 07-CV-2067, 2011 WL 6131136, at 
*17-18 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2011). 
 261 Id. at *17. 
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In addition, even if the Fire Department were able to meet 
these goals, the court would enforce the plan at least while the 
next two entry-level exams were administered. Currently, the 
Fire Department administers the exam every four years, but 
plaintiffs are hoping to condense it to every two years.262 
Therefore, the court will likely enforce the plan for at least four 
years—if not eight—regardless of the Fire Department’s progress. 
More importantly, the court overstepped its authority 
by failing to properly address the “efficacy of alternative 
remedies.”263 Specifically, the court refused to address the 
efficacy of more direct race-conscious hiring practices, and in 
fact outright rejected this possibility. A potent race-conscious 
interim hiring measure has the potential to be just as 
successful in attacking racial discrimination without 
encroaching on local government.264 In the event that these 
measures were unsuccessful, only then could the court find 
that more intensive oversight is necessary. 
C. Regardless of Who Is in Control, Minority Focused 
Recruitment Measures Should Be Implemented 
Providing for recruitment policies will lead to many of 
the advantages of race-conscious hiring without directly 
imposing a race-conscious remedy.265 Therefore, whether the 
court or the Fire Department is in control of developing the 
hiring program, it should be apparent to both parties that 
enhanced recruiting measures would be both beneficial and not 
politically costly. Thus, even if the court did not impose strict 
oversight, it is highly likely that the Fire Department would 
have implemented its own recruiting procedures.266 
  
 262 See supra note 218. 
 263 Paradise, 480 U.S. at 187. 
 264 See supra Part V.A. 
 265 While minority recruiting efforts are “race-conscious” in the general sense 
of the word, such efforts are not as controversial as affirmative action techniques that 
account for race during or after the application process itself. Minority recruiting, for 
example, does not raise any possible doubt as to the qualifications of the accepted 
applicants, because they objectively scored well on the test without adjusting for race. 
Similarly, it poses little threat to white applicants who fear that minority applicants 
who did less well on the exam will nevertheless be hired in place of them.  
 266 Indeed, the Fire Department has already proposed and began to 
implement recruitment efforts. See Alan Feuer, A Fire Department Under Pressure to 
Diversify, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/28/nyregion/a-
fire-department-under-pressure-to-diversify.html?pagewanted=all; Tim Stelloh, Fire 
Commissioner Visits Black Church to Seek Recruits, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/18/nyregion/nyc-fire-commissioner-recruits-at-black-
church.html. 
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Although minority recruitment efforts in the Fire 
Department began as early as 1991, the sincerity of the effort and 
its actual successes are open to question. In 1991, the City’s first 
black mayor and first Hispanic fire commissioner stated they 
would increase firefighter diversity.267 Fire Department officials, 
however, would rarely if ever attend meetings when minority 
recruitment was the topic of discussion and future meetings were 
eventually cancelled.268 The Fire Commissioner at the time, Carlos 
Rivera, complained that City Hall “was not really committed to 
minority hiring and . . . never gave him authorization to spend 
more money for recruiting.”269 The recruiting drive was not 
successful by any calculation; not only were minority applicants 
who passed the exam still underrepresented as compared with 
the total number of minority applicants, but the total number of 
minority applicants continued to be underrepresented when 
compared to the local labor pool.270 
Although unsuccessful in the past, if the Fire 
Department were required to implement a race-conscious 
hiring procedure until it could provide a reasonable alternative, 
it would have incentive to conduct a recruitment campaign 
properly. Under those circumstances, a successful recruitment 
campaign would be politically desirable because it would allow 
the Fire Department to avoid the public backlash from using 
quotas or race-conscious hiring; if they successfully recruit and 
train a sufficient number of qualified black and Hispanic 
applicants to meet the imposed hiring ratios, they would not 
need to engage in any race-conscious hiring after the scores 
were submitted. Thus, the desire to avoid race-conscious relief 
should make developing a recruitment policy an especially 
attractive option to both the court and the Fire Department.271 
There are many other advantages to developing a 
successful recruitment program to the benefit of all parties. It 
  
 267 William Murphy & Joseph W. Queen, Recruiting Farce FDNY Minority 
Drive Described as Sadly Lacking, NEWSDAY (N.Y.C.), June 25, 1996, at A04. 
 268 Id. (noting that “[r]ecruiters could not attend some strategy meetings 
because their supervisors gave them ‘priority’ assignments that took them elsewhere”). 
The authors derived their information from the “city’s Equal Employment Practices 
Commission, a mayoral agency, in its 1994 annual report.” Id. 
 269 Id. 
 270 See Saltonstall, supra note 215 (noting that in February 1999, “only 10% of 
those who took the February exam were black and only 12% Hispanic, an increase of 
only a few percentage points from 1992, when the last test was given”). The lack of 
minority turnout resulted “despite a much-ballyhooed minority recruiting drive the 
department undertook in 1994.” Id. 
 271 The court in United States v. City of New York has shown a propensity to 
limit race-conscious relief when possible. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text. 
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would naturally increase the number of minorities who choose 
to join the applicant pool, which no amount of race-conscious 
hiring could ever achieve directly. It would also lessen the 
negative impact of using the pool of applicants as the 
“Representative Ratio,” since the ratio of minority applicants 
could equal and possibly even eclipse the ratio of minorities in 
the local population after successful recruitment. 
A recruitment program would also help prevent the type 
of disparate impact liability that would stem from an 
underrepresentation of minority applicants. Lieutenant Rod 
Lewis believes “the recruiting problem is, in part, a matter of 
perception in the city’s minority neighborhoods . . . [y]ou see 
the Fire Department . . . [b]ut you don’t see black firefighters, 
so many kids don’t think it’s an option.”272 By reaching out to 
minorities, and sending the message that they have legitimate 
opportunities to become firefighters, the Fire Department will 
be able to break the “Irish and Italian firehouse culture in 
which fathers routinely pass on their knowledge and contacts 
to sons eager for work.”273 As a result, the City will be better 
protected from racial discrimination claims regarding its 
recruiting programs. 
The methods of recruitment suggested in plaintiffs’ 
memorandum should largely be implemented.274 It is especially 
important to develop outreach programs that help train minority 
candidates for the entry-level exam,275 since current firefighters’ 
families have been enjoying access to similar preparatory 
programs for some time.276 Such a program would be directly 
related to the subject of the litigation because it would decrease 
the disparate impact of any future testing.277 It may also be a more 
cost-effective and reliable way to reduce disparate impact than 
relying on consultants to create a test that is reliable, predictive, 
and consistent with business necessity. Standardized tests, such 
  
 272 Saltonstall, supra note 215. 
 273 See id. 
 274 See generally Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs-Intervenors’ 
Proposed Order for Injunctive Relief, City of New York, No. 07-CV-2067 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 
9, 2010), 2010 WL 6917514, ECF No. 596; see also supra Part IV.G.  
 275 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs-Intervenors’ Proposed 
Order for Injunctive Relief at 15, City of New York, No. 07-CV-2067 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 
2010), supra note 274.  
 276 See Saltonstall, supra note 215. 
 277 The City argued that their recruitment process was not the subject of the 
litigation, despite acknowledging that the court has great leeway in developing a 
remedy. See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs-Intervenors’ 
Motion for a Proposed Order for Injunctive Relief at 2-7, City of New York, No. 07-CV-
2067 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2010), 2010 WL 6917516, ECF No. 599.  
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as the SATs and LSATs, have proven that money and intense 
research can only go so far in creating a successful, 
nondiscriminatory exam.278 After more than thirty years of waiting 
for the City to develop a test that accomplishes this feat,279 the 
court should recognize that such an effort may not ever be wholly 
successful, even if the City acts in good faith. Preparing minorities 
for the exam, on the other hand, attacks the racial disparity at its 
source; it educates minorities in order for them to have the tools 
already available to nonminorities. 
CONCLUSION 
Although recent political movements have attempted to 
rid the nation of affirmative action, courts should not acquiesce 
to them because doing so undermines well-established 
doctrines in Title VII. The court in United States v. City of New 
York, however, has given full consideration to the movement in 
its decision. In an effort to avoid race-conscious hiring 
measures, the court instead instituted an extensive oversight 
program. While this program gives the plaintiffs, past victims 
of discrimination, and future minority applicants hope of 
recourse for the systematic disparate treatment that plagued 
the Fire Department for decades, this achievement could have 
been reached without imposing heavy oversight on local 
government by a federal court. 
Future courts, when dealing with deep-seated 
discrimination, should instead require defendants to engage in 
interim hiring at a ratio equal to that of the local minority 
population. If such a plan were implemented here, the City 
would have had sufficient incentive to develop an unbiased 
exam and genuine recruitment efforts within a short time.  
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